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Department of Engineering and Built Environment, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK
ABSTRACT: The design of a subsea production system needs to ensure high reliability and safety fig-
ures since these assets will be deployed in harsh environments for extended periods of time. Maintenance 
costs associated with these systems represent a significant percentage of the total operational expenditure 
incurred by an Oil & Gas operator. Traditional reactive maintenance approaches applied on subsea equip-
ment are starting to drop in their efficiency as degradation occurs on such systems resulting in prolonged 
downtime periods. Prognostics and Health Management is a relatively new topic and other industry sec-
tors have demonstrated that it can provide a solution for reducing maintenance costs and improving sys-
tems’ overall availability. This paper presents a prognostic and health management development process 
suitable for subsea production systems.
typical engineering design and operational process 
of a subsea system and it involves integration and 
concurrent analysis of multi-disciplinary sources 
of knowledge and interaction between several 
engineering functions.
Section  2 of this paper discusses the current 
prognostic approaches and the level of adoption 
of PHM for subsea equipment. Section 3 will cover 
four engineering disciplines and their potential use 
for the development of the PHM capability. Sec-
tion 4 will present a novel PHM development proc-
ess capable of integrating knowledge, information 
and data within concurrent engineering analysis. 
In section 5, an instantiation of the PHM develop-
ment process for a XT will be presented.
2 STATE OF THE ART OF PHM
Four different types of prognostic approaches cur-
rently exist:
•	 Experience-based prognostic approaches are 
based on historical data and knowledge accu-
mulated during the lifecycle of systems.
•	 Model-based approaches involve the construc-
tion of mathematical model which integrates the 
underlying physics of failure of the critical com-
ponents of the system, their degradation and 
their failure modes.
•	 Data-driven prognostic approaches specify the 
behavior of a system through gathered opera-
tional data (CM data via sensors and/or event 
data). The data is processed and compared with 
key parameters/features to predict the probabil-
ity of fault occurrence.
1 INTRODUCTION
When oil and gas exploration is not economically 
viable through tradition oil platforms, subsea pro-
duction systems represent an alternative for the 
majority of operators. A Subsea Production Sys-
tem (SPS) is a collection of hydrocarbon extracting 
equipment located on the seabed and its main com-
ponents consist of a seabed wellhead, subsea x-mas 
tree (XT), manifold, umbilical, riser, a network of 
pipelines, flowline as well as subsea power and con-
trol systems. The amount of shallow water oil and 
gas reserves is decreasing. This has led exploration 
and production into deep waters where SPS are the 
preferred solution to make development economi-
cally viable. The subsea industry is now facing a 
number of challenges on how to improve reliability 
and safety of critical assets in an economical way. 
Subsea lifecycle analysis demonstrated that Capital 
Expenditure and Reliability Availability Mainte-
nance Expenditure (RAMEX) are the two major 
costs of a subsea asset, with downtime cost making 
up the majority of RAMEX. Prognostic and health 
management (PHM) has the capability to address 
these financial challenges and reduce the downtime 
cost by assessing and predicting the Remaining 
Useful Life (RUL) of a component/system while 
supporting the system’s goal and compliance with 
high level requirements- safety, reliability, availabil-
ity, maintainability etc.
At present, the main research focus area of 
PHM in the context of subsea applications is only 
targeting the development of such capability for 
isolated components. This paper introduces on an 
integrated approach to design the PHM for a SPS 
at the system level. This approach is mapped on a 
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•	 Hybrid prognostics are a combination of the 
model-based and data-driven with parameters in 
the model being continuously updated when data 
from service becomes available with the ultimate 
purpose of improving the accuracy of the pre-
diction (Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer, Hess, & 
Wu, 2006) (Medjaher & Zerhouni, 2013), (da 
Silva & Radespiel, 2013).
The majority of industry sectors adopted 
the data-driven prognostic approaches as a first 
attempt for the development PHM capability, par-
ticularly for complex systems (Bykovsky, 2008) as 
this enables the development of the understanding 
of degradation without the construction of math-
ematical model capturing the physics of failure. 
Currently, in the subsea arena, there are very few 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) solutions 
deployed in field. The major Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM) for SPS include companies 
like: Technip/FMC Technologies, Cameron, GE, 
Aker Solutions, OneSubsea etc. Based on infor-
mation available in the public domain, Cameron 
provides a blowout preventer condition based mon-
itoring system and riser annulus condition system. 
However, FMC has delivered a first attempt of a 
system level Condition and Performance Monitor-
ing (CPM) capability for a subsea asset, currently 
being installed at the Gjøa field (Soosaipillai, 
Roald, Alfstad, Aas, Smith & Bressand, 2013).
3 ENGINEERING DISCIPLINES AND THE 
STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN THE 
SUBSEA PHM DESIGN
3.1 Overview
To develop and implement any of the prognostic 
approaches mentioned in the previous section, dif-
ferent types of data and information is required 
(Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer, Hess, & Wu, 2006). 
This information and data represents the output 
of several engineering disciplines being owned by 
various functional teams. The design stage for a 
subsea system is usually undertaken by the OEM 
and suppliers under the requirements established 
by an operator. During the operation period, 
maintenance teams will be hired by the operator to 
Inspect/Maintain/Repair (IMR) the subsea equip-
ment, although, the maintenance of control sys-
tems will be the responsibility of the OEM. Very 
often, upgrades, overhauls and de-commissioning 
typically are done by different parties. During the 
life time of a subsea production system, multiple 
organizations are involved and a subsea system 
may include components and processes originating 
from all over the world. Throughout the entire life-
cycle of a subsea field, interactions between differ-
ent engineering disciplines belonging to different 
companies, which are operating under multiple 
languages and cultures, also take place. Hence, one 
of the challenges is the fact that the data/informa-
tion required to develop a PHM solution is not 
unified and/or centralized. In the context of sub-
sea applications, these engineering functions and 
the data/information associated to each of them is 
captured in Table 1.
3.2 Subsea system design—initiation of the PHM 
design
PHM Design must be underpinned by a level of 
understanding of the healthy state of a system. In 
the case of a subsea system, this characterization 
is developed during various stages of the design 
process (conceptual design, front end engineering 
design (FEED) and detailed design). Engineering 
modelling is carried out during the FEED. Modifi-
cations to the design (to include the PHM capabil-
ity as an afterthought) might be extremely costly, 
therefore it is recommended to design-in the PHM 
function as the asset design progresses through var-
ious technical and business gates. It is instrumental 
at this stage to derive the PHM requirements from 
the subsea asset requirements, if  such a capability 
is to be developed.
3.3 Reliability and availability analysis—
foundation of the PHM design
In the offshore industry, Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) tends to be one of 
most common approaches for reliability analysis 
and it has been increasingly implemented in the 
last ten years on subsea projects (DNV, 2013). 
FMECA also forms the foundation for good PHM 
design (Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer, Hess, & 
Wu, 2006) although, in the context of  subsea 
Table 1. Engineering disciplines.
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equipment, it is mainly used to support qualifi-
cation of new technologies or re-qualification of 
legacy systems. Reliability analysis must be based 
on the actual design of the system therefore a con-
current engineer design and reliability analysis is 
recommended to ensure the both disciplines are 
targeting the same point of  truth. Input is required 
from IMR to ensure the efficiency and accuracy 
of this analysis. A FMECA study attempts a good 
understanding of system behavior under faulty 
conditions is instrumental to be able to design 
the diagnostic and prognostic capability. Histori-
cal data and knowledge can also be employed to 
adjust or re-design components/equipment/sys-
tems to improve reliability targets. This informa-
tion usually resides with the operators and OEMs, 
but it is very often not available for the reliability 
team responsible with the qualification of the sub-
sea equipment under investigation.
3.4 Control & instrumentation/CPM—core of the 
PHM design
A large number of parameters to assess the con-
dition of an SPS is currently captured by CPM 
through sensors i.e. acoustic control systems, 
multiphase flow meters, accelerometers, pressure 
and temperature sensors, sand and leak detection 
systems, as well as detectors for dropped objects 
(ISO:13828, 2010). These types of sensors found 
their way into the subsea design either through 
regulations or recommendation and there is a con-
sensus in the industry that they are not engineered 
for the purposes of ensuring higher availability 
figures. Production efficiency performance of sub-
sea equipment has been particularly poor in recent 
years, reaching a low point of 60% in 2012 and 
averaging at 71% in 2015 although back in 2004 
the production figures were above 80%. Degrada-
tion of production equipment is one of the con-
tributor factors to this drop. Abnormal behavior 
of subsea equipment can be detected by condition 
monitoring solutions and information sensed by 
instrumentation is sent to the control module and 
interpreted by the operational teams (Markeset, 
Moreno-Trejo, & Kumar, 2013) to allow informed 
decisions guiding the operation and maintenance.
3.5 Maintenance—exploitation of the PHM 
design
Various types of maintenance strategies exist and 
can be implemented for subsea equipment in serv-
ice. Corrective maintenance is typically applied after 
the failure has occurred. A scheduled maintenance 
regime aims at dealing with faults before they occur, 
but they are based on fixed time intervals. The con-
ditional maintenance only supports non-dynamic 
estimation of the degradation and the most recent 
approaches take advantage of the PHM capability 
to estimate the RUL of a critical component and 
to plan the maintenance job according to these cal-
culations (based on data-driven, model-based and 
hybrid prognostics algorithms). The PHM capabil-
ity of a system is represented by a set of techniques 
and methods from different disciplines that combine 
knowledge and data to support predictive mainte-
nance by detecting, diagnosing, predicting, advising 
and analyzing (postmortem) the failure information 
(Guillén, Crespo, Macchi, & Gómez, 2016). The 
information and data related to functional failures 
(failure modes) and physical failures (faults) of sub-
sea equipment is scarce, so the traditional reactive 
maintenance approaches (corrective and sched-
uled) are still the preferred choices for oil and gas 
operators. The predictive maintenance regimes also 
present their own set of challenges and these must be 
considered during the design stage (the inability to 
accurately and reliably predict the RUL of a compo-
nent/system; the inability of maintenance systems to 
document, learn and recommend that action should 
be taken; the lack of tools capable of demonstrating 
the effectiveness of a predictive maintenance pro-
gram). SPS have been typically designed to operate 
over five years without failure, thus the operator will 
plan to carry out preventive maintenance every five 
years (Moreno-Trejo & Markeset, 2012). However, 
over the last decade, reliability data shows some 
components had to be maintained/replaced sooner 
to prevent failure. Hence, traditional maintenance 
can incur huge expense and consequential damage 
for an asset and the environment—such as pollution, 
loss of production, etc. (Markeset, Moreno-Trejo, & 
Kumar, 2013; Uyiomendo & Markeset, 2015). In 
recent years, traditional maintenance activities in 
the oil and gas industry are transforming through 
the adoption of CBM which are ensuring efficient 
maintenance, reducing lifecycle costs and improving 
the systems’ overall availability. The application of 
CBM and PHM (as an extension of CBM) in the 
oil and gas industry has started to be exploited on 
for example, drilling systems, control systems and 
pumping systems.
4 SUBSEA PHM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
To determine the Prognostic method, these four 
major disciplines need to share information and data 
with each other. However, PHM development for an 
entire subsea system is still a challenge from the view 
of big data management and information support, 
thus it is hard to build those disciplines into system.
In this paper, we propose an integrated approach 
to subsea PHM design process. This process is 
captured in Figure  1 and it highlights the data/
information exchanged between the four main 
engineering disciplines, discussed in the previous 
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section. The proposed subsea PHM development 
process includes feedback loops that are intended 
to enable enhanced data collection, exchange and 
analysis of knowledge related to the degradation 
of subsea components, addressed by different 
engineering disciplines as the subsea project moves 
through various technical and business reviews. 
Good communication during a generic design engi-
neering process includes both historical and cur-
rent information to be shared freely, problems to be 
reported, views to be exchanged, and positive inter-
personal relationships to be retained, as the design 
progresses through various technical and business 
gates. However, the effective communication is also 
dependent on balancing the levels of information 
to the complexity of the task/topic, avoiding both 
over-complication and over-simplification. Hence, 
suitable levels of information must be delivered to 
the correct person at the correct time to communi-
cate essentials without the receiver being overbur-
dened with data (Parkes & Hodkiewicz, 2011).
Step 1 – The start of the PHM design process 
is represented by the requirements phase. High-
Level (HL) requirements are typically divided into 
functional requirements (FR) and non-functional 
requirement (NFR) categories. Functional require-
ments define the technical details of a system (includ-
ing the function of the system and the functions of 
each individual component) and non-functional 
requirements cover the attributes of the system 
(such as safety, reliability, maintainability, usability, 
performance, security, etc.). The Design/Re-design/ 
Instrumentation phase of the PHM development 
process coordinates various engineering analysis 
to ensure the final subsea design is meeting the 
requirements established at the start of the project. 
During the design phase, data associated with the 
environmental conditions, reservoir, well comple-
tion, process and operations, host facilities, safety 
and hazards should be considered when progressing 
through conceptual, FEED and detailed design. 
These engineering efforts are targeting the techni-
cal requirements (also known as functional require-
ments (FR)) of a subsea system since this design 
element is heavily regulated and supported through 
recommended practices (ISO 13628–1, 2010). Non-
Functional Requirements are also considered by the 
current subsea design best practices and they cover 
safety, performance and security. However, there is 
no attempt to define and to target the reliability and 
maintainability requirements at the early stage of 
the design. This influences the PHM requirements 
definition as these are derived from the reliability 
and maintainability requirements. Only recently, 
the industry has generated recommended practices 
like the API-RP-17 N on topics related to reliability, 
technical risk and integrity management (API RP 
17 N, 2009). However, they are not yet adopted due 
to the lack of tools, processes and meaningful reli-
ability data to support their implementation. Reli-
ability and maintainability requirements should be 
part of the non-functional requirement (NFR) of 
the system. Deriving PHM requirements should be 
done from system’s high-level (HL) Non-Functional 
requirements. For example, a HL NF requirement 
for a XT can be affordability by reducing the down-
time periods while keeping the same levels of safety. 
In this manner, cost and safety become main drivers 
for the development of a PHM solution. Derived 
PHM requirements can be represented: PHM 
Requirement 1 – the XT must have a feature that 
can reliably predict functional failures at least one 
week prior to the actual event and PHM Require-
ment 2: the XT must have the capability of offer-
ing mitigation/advisory generation in the context 
of current operational conditions. Having access to 
information provided by such features, the opera-
tor reasonable time to schedule a vessel, equipment, 
personnel to carry out an intervention on the faulty 
components.
Figure 1. An integrated approach for exchanging engineering knowledge to support Subsea PHM Design.
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Step 2 – To support the PHM within the subsea 
design phase, reliability analysis needs to be carried 
out concurrently with the subsea system design. Reli-
ability analysis should be based on the actual design 
data to support the engineering analysis that can 
identify the means to detect and isolate the potential 
faults which may occur during the operation. One 
way to support the realization of this step is through 
the exploitation of functional models which can sup-
port reliability engineers to carry out analysis such as 
FMECA, Fault Tree analysis (FTA), and Reliability 
Block Diagrams (RBD) from the very early stages of 
the subsea design process. These methods and tech-
niques can also underpin the Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) and Back-Fit RCM analysis 
at later stages of the lifecycle. RCM includes four 
elements that are critical to a maintenance program 
aimed at improving availability of a given asset. 
These elements are: preservation of the system func-
tion, identification of the failure modes that can lead 
to functional failures (and sequentially downtime), 
prioritization of failure mode candidates based on 
Occurrence (O), Severity (S) and Detectability (D) 
by highlighting the Risk Priority Number (RPN = O 
× S × D) of each of the candidates and finally selec-
tions of applicable and effective tasks to control the 
failure modes. Back-Fit RCM builds on the same 
RCM principles by incorporated operational reli-
ability figures (by updating the O, S, D parameters) 
and evaluating the applicability and effectiveness of 
the control measures. We believe that the reliability, 
availability and maintainability analyses should be 
the foundation of the PHM design as it can high-
light the risk associated with a brand new subsea 
design or a legacy system using information from 
service (provided to the reliability team during Step 
7 using the output of a bespoke maintenance ana-
lytics engines). Sequentially, using this information, 
the design will be assessed by the reliability authority 
during a technical review (targeted reliability assess-
ment) and if the design fails to meet a specific tar-
get, the risk and the critical components must be 
addressed either through re-design, redundancy or 
addition of instrumentation. Informed trade-off  
studies between these three approaches must be 
in place to guarantee the final design meets all the 
requirements of the project. However, this topic is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for far 
too long, reliability assessment on subsea equipment 
was carried out only to present a measured reliabil-
ity figure to support re-certification of production 
equipment already in exploitation.
If  the PHM is channeled as derived require-
ment from the RAM requirements, specific levels 
of targeted reliability can be achieved. Also, differ-
ent PHM requirements and implementation strate-
gies can be evaluated at this stage against specific 
sets of RAM requirements. Very often, in subsea 
applications, redundancy seems to be the option 
preferred by the system designers as this guaran-
tees improved availability figures when the primary 
component/sub-system fails. The major drawback 
of the redundancy approach is that fact that it does 
not offer any indication of the RUL for the critical 
component, sub-system or system, therefore, our 
case for addition of instrumentation supporting 
the PHM capability. If  instrumentation is required 
for diagnostics and prognostics purposes, this must 
be defined by the PHM analysts in collaboration 
with the subsea design and reliability teams. We 
believe that majority of the condition monitor-
ing applications existent in a subsea environment 
were driven by vendors of sensors capable of tar-
geting symptoms associated with specific failures. 
This approach captures failures in isolation and 
does not account for propagation of faults lead-
ing to functional failures of other components and 
sequentially to failure of the system. This limita-
tion can be overcome using functional models of 
the system, functional relationships and failure/
effects dependencies in a system for both func-
tional and physical failures, defined using widely 
accepted, well defined failure taxonomies. Once the 
stakeholders of the asset have validated the propa-
gation tables (component’s reaction to functional 
failures of the system) generated against analysis 
capturing various end-item effects. The end-item 
effect is the consequence a failure mode has on the 
operation, functional output of the system at 
the highest indenture level (an item’s position in 
the system hierarchy relative to the top-level item).
What we propose in step 2 is an implementation 
of the API 17 N recommended practices through a 
concurrent design-reliability analysis by evaluating 
the actual reliability of the design by highlighting the 
effects of failure modes leading to functional failures.
Step 3 – enables an informed dialog between 
RAM engineers and PHM analysts by allowing the 
use of system level propagation table (a collection of 
all the failure mode signatures—the effects (through-
out the system, and not just at the point of occur-
rence) of a given failure mode universe. Currently, 
the job description of a PHM analyst falls somehow 
under the control team although we believe that its 
responsibility and involvement goes beyond the 
control systems. The PHM team should liaise very 
closely with the design team as it aims at the identifi-
cation and optimization of sensor set solutions capa-
ble of detecting, isolating and making predictions 
of a given set of failure modes considered under 
the PHM analysis. The mean of realization of this 
dialog is represented by the reliability models popu-
lated with failure and criticality information of fail-
ure concepts. The automated PHM instrumentation 
analysis aims to identify and optimize, in a system-
atic manner, the sensor set configurations capable 
of supporting the detection, diagnosis, prediction 
functions of a subsea asset to further enable advisory 
1022
generation. It also aims to calculate, for each sensor 
set solution identified during this process, the fault 
detection and isolation characteristic representing 
the proportion of failure modes selected for PHM 
analysis that can be detected and identified by a given 
sensor set under consideration. The PHM instru-
mentation analysis must be able to allow modifica-
tion of existing sensor arrangements based on user 
knowledge or trade-offs. Legacy sensors present on 
the system can be considered as part of this analy-
sis, although qualification institutions and regulators 
will not easily accept interrogation of sensors used 
for fail-safe control purposes (functional safety sen-
sors). During this step, criticality of failures affecting 
a subsea system must be considered during the PHM 
instrumentation analysis. For new subsea designs, no 
measured criticality information exists and this must 
be defined using input from various stake-holders 
(subsea designers, RAM team, Operators, IMR 
personnel) by taking into account qualification of 
new technology standards and recommended prac-
tices (DNV-RP-A203, 2011; DNV-DSS-401, 2012). 
For subsea legacy systems, the criticality should be 
considered given what failed in service and it can 
be characterized through occurrence, severity and 
detectability parameters by calculating a risk prior-
ity number for every single component of the sub-
sea equipment. The PHM instrumentation analysis 
should be capable of running the identification and 
optimization algorithms for specific groups of com-
ponents by focusing on specific targeted criticality. 
There is also a feedback loop between the PHM and 
RAM functions meant to ensure that the selected 
sensor set solution meets the reliability criteria of the 
system (as a sensor that will fail in service ahead of 
the component that it is monitoring for failure does 
not ensure higher levels of availability for the asset). 
This feedback loop is represented within the PHM 
development process by Step 4.
Step 5 of the PHM development process ena-
bles the dialogue between the PHM analysts and 
the subsea design team. Although represented as 
a separate link/step, this dialog should take place 
concurrently with the reliability analysis of the 
instrumented subsea system. Decisions regard-
ing unfeasible sensor set solutions are taken, and 
trade-off  studies related to cost, weight, cover-
age, location, reliability, probability of detection, 
probability of prediction, likelihood positives and 
negatives ratios, physical constraints, loads, envi-
ronmental conditions should be carried out by a 
multi-disciplinary team led by the RAM function. 
During this step, the reliability and maintainability 
requirements are verified and validated by group 
of experts. As a mean of realization of this dia-
logue, we propose a model-based approach as this 
will allow rapid generation of sensor sets spanning 
multiple levels of hierarchy for a subsea system by 
considering technical and economical metrics.
Step 6 facilitates the exploitation of the data 
provided by a PHM-enabled subsea system and 
the support offered to the IMR function. Data 
from sensors will be plugged to diagnostic and 
prognostic engines capable of supporting the IMR 
function on fault detection, fault isolation and ide-
ally, prediction of the remaining useful life.
Step 7 of the PHM development process facili-
tates an implementation of an integrated analysis-
drive sustainment activity. It provides traceability 
of the subsea maintenance activities when using 
PHM information. We recommend the use of 
function-based reliability models to gather, share 
and analyze maintenance data in order to enable 
automated failure and data reporting, analysis and 
corrective action system (FRACAS/DRACAS).
5 CASE STUDY
For the implementation of the integrated PHM 
development process for subsea equipment, a com-
mercial-of-the-shelf software tool, namely Main-
tenance Aware Design environment (MADe™) 
developed by PHM Technology was employed. It 
was used to carry out an instantiation of the proc-
ess on a XT. The selection of this software pack-
age was based on the previous success in using it in 
aerospace industry sector on fuel system and envi-
ronmental control systems (Hess, Frith & Calvello, 
2005). MADe™ is a ‘model-based’ engineering 
tool that can provide an integrated framework to 
manage, control and analyse the information and 
data throughout different disciplines including the 
design, safety, reliability, availability and maintain-
ability for a high-value high-complex systems. How-
ever, a good inter-discipline communication requires 
expert document management and control, and in 
this instance this is achieved through a model gath-
ering data and knowledge from various disciplined. 
The instantiation of the PHM design process was 
carried on a typical subsea XT. Several concurrent 
engineering analyses belonging to separate engineer-
ing disciplines, but derived from a single model of 
this XT (developed within MADe™) were carried 
out. The outcomes of some of these analyses are 
highlighted in Table 2 (a and b). These are briefly 
summarized further on. The functional model 
accommodates information describing the input 
and output flows of each component, the causal 
relationships between these flows that allow for 
systematic propagation of failures throughout the 
system and criticality data (retrieved from the 6th 
edition of the Offshore Reliability Data—Volume 2). 
Knowledge and data characterizing the failure 
of each of the component forming a subsea XT 
was added to the functional model using concepts 
defining the causes, mechanisms, faults, symptoms 
and the links to the functional failures previously 
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Table 2a. Outcomes of implementation of the integrated PHM development process.
defined. Significant challenges were faced when 
trying to align the failure taxonomy used by the 
OREDA (based on the ISO: 14224 standard) and 
the failure taxonomy employed and defined by 
PHM Technology in MADe™.
A clear understanding of the causes, mechanisms, 
potential symptoms leading to a fault and the way 
this fault develops into a functional failure is instru-
mental in selecting the correct maintenance task or 
the PHM instrumentation, in an informed manner. 
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Four components were selected during the critical-
ity assessment as having a significant impact on 
the function of the XT, namely the choke valve, the 
down hold safety valve, the production master valve 
and the tubing hanger. For the scenario of these four 
functional failures, 100  sensor set solutions were 
automatically generated from the functional model, 
having between 7–9 sensors (measuring pressure and 
flow rate) offering between 50–100% fault coverage. 
Ambiguity groups were clearly highlighted during 
this process due the similarities in the fault signa-
tures characterizing two of the faults. At this stage, 
the PHM development process allow investigations 
on the trade-off studies on the sensor set solutions 
very early on during the design process and various 
maintenance strategies can be benchmarked when 
using specific diagnostic and prognostic engines cou-
pled to the instrumentation identified in the previous 
step.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The definition and articulation of cost-effective 
maintenance regimes is a challenging task for sub-
sea assets. Very often, they are over-engineered since 
they are required to operate in harsh conditions 
for long period of times. Various stakeholders are 
involved with these assets throughout the entire life-
cycle of these assets and knowledge related with the 
de gradation of this equipment is scattered through-
out various organizations being owned and used 
by different engineering functions. In this paper, an 
integrated PHM development process was presented 
as a multi-disciplinary engineering analysis, comple-
menting the current development of subsea equip-
ment. The proposed development process aims to 
help subsea designers to integrate the development 
of the PHM capability of a subsea asset with the 
actual design of such systems. This is meant to hap-
pen at the early stages of the design process, but the 
process also enables the retrofit of such capabilities 
on legacy subsea fields to achieve higher availability 
and operational reliability figures. This is achieved 
by placing the reliability, availability and maintain-
ability engineering analysis at the heart of the subsea 
asset and PHM system level design.
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